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A recent surge of Anglophone inte-
rest in German Idealism and early 
German Romanticism has resulted in 
nothing less than a publishing boom 
of studies in this area. Frederick Bei-
ser's work was crucial in preparing 
the ground for this development of 
English language studies of German 
Idealism and early German Romanti-
cism. In The Fate of Reason: Ger-
man Philosophy Between Kant and 
Fichte (1987) and Enlightenment, 
Revolution, and Romanticism: The 
Genesis of Modern German Political 
Thought (1992), Beiser made a com-
pelling case that many German phi-
losophers of the immediate post-
Kantian period and the issues that 
they raised were worthy of much 
more attention than they had hitherto 
received in the English-speaking 
world. 
The Fate of Reason not only wove 
a story of the themes that characteri-
zed the immediate post-Kantian peri-
od (all centered around what Beiser 
calls the „authority of reason"), but it 
also provided a much needed context 
which enabled the contributions of 
the immediate post-Kantian philoso-
phers to be appreciated. In The Fate 
of Reason, Beiser carefully analyzed: 
the effects of the controversy bet-
ween Mendelssohn and Jacobi con-
cerning Lessing's alleged Spinozism 
(1780-85); the profound effects 
which the publication of Kant's Cri-
tique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) 
had upon the philosophical climate 
of the period; K.L. Reinhold's at-
tempts to establish a foundation for 
Kant's Critique, which found their 
fullest expression in his Über das 
Fundament des philosophischen Wis-
sens (1791); and the effects of Fich-
te's Wissenschaftslehre (1794) on the 
German philosophical mood of the 
period. 
Beiser's work imbued the philoso-
phical drama that unfolded on the 
German philosophical scene of the 
late 1700s and early 1800s with new 
life. This reawakening of the key 
controversies and the figures who 
were crucial players in this drama 
has opened exciting new paths of 
study As a result of Beiser's innova-
tive work, the contributions of the 
early German Romantics (figures 
such as Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich 
von Hardenberg (Novalis), and Höl-
derlin), too long considered to be of 
merely literary significance, are be-
ginning to receive attention from phi-
losophers in the United States. 
There has been a tendency to give 
Hegel all the credit for the great stri-
des in post-Kantian German philoso-
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phy, and Beiser's earlier work helped 
to correct this limited reading of the 
history of German philosophy. His 
most recent study continues in a si-
milar vein: giving a voice to thinkers 
who have been sorely neglected in 
the English-speaking world and pre-
senting a well grounded alternative 
to the tradition of reading German 
Idealism as a movement shaped pri-
marily by Hegel. Beiser is an impres-
sively astute philosophical historian 
of philosophy who consistently of-
fers a rich, historical framework with 
which to come to a deeper, fuller ap-
preciation of key figures who are of-
ten overlooked, and his most recent 
book is no exception. 
Beiser's study of German Idealism 
from 1781-1801 is divided into four 
parts; each part is so comprehensive 
and far-reaching that one can almost 
speak of four books in one. Beiser 
begins with ten detailed chapters on 
Kant's critique of idealism. In the fi-
nal chapter of this section on Kant, 
he carefully dispels the „stubborn 
myth" that „Kant dropped off the 
philosophical stage in the 1790s" (p. 
180) and presents the Opus postu-
mum as an important contribution to 
the history of German Idealism. Sec-
tion II of the study is dedicated to an 
examination of Fichte's critique of 
subjectivism, an examination that at-
tempts to clear the waters that have 
muddied a clear reception of Fichte's 
thought and of German Idealism. In 
the eight chapters that constitute this 
part of the study, Beiser takes on the 
difficult tasks of showing, „how 
Fichte evades both solipsism and a 
transcendent metaphysics" and of ex-
plaining „[Fichte's] idealist princi-
ples and his teaching about the limits 
of human knowledge" (p. 218). That 
is, Beiser steers a middle path bet-
ween the two basic and „utterly irre-
concilable" interpretations of Fichte: 
the reading of him as a subjective 
idealist and the reading of him as an 
absolute idealist. In the four chapters 
of Part III of the study, Beiser moves 
to an analysis of the absolute idea-
lism that he argues characterized the 
work of three important early Ger-
man Romantics, Friedrich Schlegel, 
Novalis, and Hölderlin. The book 
concludes with a treatment of idea-
lism in the most protean figure of the 
period, Friedrich Schelling, a thinker 
who moved in and out of the Roman-
tic circle, and whose philosophical 
positions on thinkers such as Kant 
and Fichte were ever changing. Bei-
ser connects each of these parts to 
tell his enlightening story of German 
Idealism's struggle against subjecti-
vism. 
Beiser rejects the „seductively 
simple" account of the history of 
German Idealism, according to 
which it is one long move towards an 
inflated self-contained subjectivism, 
arguing that the „development of 
German Idealism is not the culmina-
tion but the nemesis of the Cartesian 
tradition (i.e., the doctrine that the 
subject has an immediate knowledge 
only of its own ideas, so that it has 
no knowledge beyond its circle of 
consciousness)" (p. 2). In Beiser's 
history of German Idealism, it is not 
subjectivism that triumphs, but rather 
the struggle against subjectivism that 
emerges triumphantly, a struggle that 
Beiser characterizes in terms of an 
„intense effort to break out of the cir-
cle of consciousness" or „egocentric 
predicament". 
The egocentric predicament is the 
problem created by the transcenden-
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ce of our ability to know whether our 
ideas of the world and the world ac-
tually correspond, a problem that 
might leave us trapped in an utterly 
subjective world with no real con-
nection to external reality. According 
to Beiser, German Idealism is com-
pelling not because it leads us to the 
subject, trapping us there, but becau-
se it leads, surprisingly perhaps, to 
the development of a robust realism 
and naturalism. German Idealism has 
suffered because of the general mi-
sperception that all forms of idealism 
amount to anti-realism. The connec-
tion that Beiser makes between rea-
lism and idealism, seemingly odd 
bedfellows, at least for those bred on 
the Anglo-American philosophical 
tradition, can only be made because 
Beiser vehemently rejects any sub-
jectivist interpretation of German 
Idealism. 
He claims that the general tenden-
cy to read German Idealism as a 
form of vulgar subjectivism is rooted 
in a failure to distinguish between 
two very different forms of idealism: 
„the two versions of idealism corre-
spond to two senses of the term „ide-
al", the ideal can be the mental in 
contrast to the physical, the spiritual 
rather than the material, or it can by 
the archetypical in contrast to the ec-
typical, the normative rather than the 
substantive. Idealism in the former 
sense is the doctrine that all reality 
depends upon some self-conscious 
subject; idealism in the latter sense is 
the doctrine that everything is a ma-
nifestation of the ideal, an appearan-
ce of reason" (p. 6). Featured in Bei-
ser's story is idealism in the second 
sense mentioned above, and so a 
fresh, new story of German Idealism 
emerges, one which frees it from the 
confines of the subjectivist interpre-
tation to which it has all too often be-
en doomed. 
In Beiser's version, „the story of 
German Idealism becomes a story 
about the progressive de-subjectivi-
zation of the Kantian legacy, the gro-
wing recognition that the ideal realm 
consists not in personality and sub-
jectivity, but in the normative, the ar-
chetypical, and the intelligible" (p. 
6). Beiser's story of German Idea-
lism is told in terms of the unfolding 
of neo-Platonism, with its „ultimate 
heirs" identified as the Marburg Neo-
Kantians, Hermann Cohen, Paul Na-
torp, and Emst Cassirer. 
Throughout the four parts of the 
study, Beiser maintains a focus on 
the meaning of idealism itself and 
the reaction against subjectivism car-
ried out by the idealists of the period 
under consideration. Beiser's sustai-
ned attention to the very meaning of 
idealism does indeed reveal that Ger-
man Idealism from 1781-1801 was 
not a „grandiose form of subjecti-
vism", but rather a reaction against 
any sort of subjectivism, a reaction 
whose final goal was to break out of 
the egocentric predicament and do 
nothing less than prove the reality of 
the external world. In short, the batt-
le against subjectivism, leads Ger-
man Idealism towards a robust rea-
lism. 
Beiser's study is also dedicated to 
correcting the widespread misper-
ception that the young Romantics 
played merely a transitional role in 
the post-Kantian period. Beiser con-
vincingly argues that the young Ro-
mantics were crucial players in the 
development of German Idealism: 
indeed, „the early romantics [not He-
gel, as commonly believed] were the 
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true founders of absolute idealism4' 
(viii). The absolute idealism that Bei-
ser imputes to the Romantics is a 
kind of objective idealism, one that 
attempts to explain the reality of the 
external world on the basis of idealist 
principles, but which does not attach 
the forms of experience to a subject, 
but rather to the realm of pure being 
as such. The ideal, on Beiser's rea-
ding of the Romantics' breed of idea-
lism, is the archetypical, intelligible, 
and structural, not the subjective, 
mental, or spiritual. 
Beiser's privileging of the early 
German Romantics in his tale of 
German Idealism will put Hegelians 
on guard. Indeed, Beiser openly as-
serts that his study „is a reaction 
against the Hegelian legacy" and fur-
ther that Hegel was a „tortoise 
among hares" (p. 11), the hares being 
his predecessors in Jena, who never 
created grand systems, and who we-
re treated with contempt in Hegel's 
rewriting of the history of philoso-
phy. As Beiser puts it: „There is not a 
single Hegelian theme that cannot be 
traced to his predecessors in Jena, to 
many earlier thinkers whom Hegel 
and the Hegelian school either belitt-
led or ignored" (p. 10). Beiser rejects 
the teleological reading of history 
that followed in Hegel's wake. One 
consequence of this rejection is that 
in his daring and original study, Bei-
ser does not read German Idealism 
as a progression toward Hegel or a 
decline from Kant, but rather pre-
sents German Idealism as a much 
more nuanced movement and looks 
carefully at the contributions of indi-
vidual thinkers on their own terms. 
Beiser argues that the German Ro-
mantics were absolute idealists, but 
stresses that their idealism had little 
to do with sweeping claims regar-
ding the dependency of reality upon 
the self-conscious subject. Their 
idealism was far less subjective, and 
while it did commit them to the 
claim that „everything is a manifest-
ation of the ideal, an appearance of 
reason", they did not conceive of this 
manifestation of the ideal as a sub-
jective, mental or spiritual appearan-
ce of reason, but rather its normative 
or archetypical manifestation. Abso-
lute idealism is not subjective idea-
lism with a subject inflated to com-
prehend the whole of reality, but a 
form of realism. Moreover, as abso-
lute idealism derives „the transcen-
dental subject from its place within 
nature" (p. 4), this kind of idealism is 
also connected to a certain kind of 
naturalism that is rooted in the Ro-
mantics' view that the absolute is 
„nothing less than the whole of natu-
re" (p. 356), with nature understood 
as some sort of organic whole. Bei-
ser stresses that the naturalism of ab-
solute idealism is not simply empiri-
cal naturalism „which explains 
everything in the phenomenal world 
according to natural laws, but which 
leaves the noumenal world untou-
ched. Rather, it maintains that we 
can explain not only empirical con-
sciousness but transcendental self-
consciousness according to its place 
in nature" (p. 355). So, far from trap-
ping us in an isolated subject cut off 
from the world, absolute idealism is 
shown to throw us into the world, 
with no clear-cut divisions between 
subjects and objects, with everything 
conceived as a part of a living, brea-
thing whole of nature. 
Beiser also corrects the picture of 
the absolute idealism of the Roman-
tics as a breed of neo-foundationa-
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lism-on this point, he is in the good 
company of the leading German 
scholars of Romanticism, Dieter 
Henrich and Manfred Frank, who ha-
ve each done work on the early stu-
dents of K.L. Reinhold (LB. Erhard, 
CI. Diez, F. Weißhuhn, C.C.E. 
Schmid, F.C. Forberg, J.RA. Feuer-
bach, and F.I. Niethammer, among 
others) and have carefully traced the 
development of romantic skepticism 
regarding the feasibility of establis-
hing first principles for philosophy. 
Yet, there is, despite agreement on 
the point of anti-foundationalism as a 
formative element in the philosophi-
cal thought of the early German Ro-
mantics, a strident point of contenti-
on between Frank and Henrich's 
characterization of the early German 
Romantics, on the one hand, and 
Beiser's, on the other. 
Frank, for example, argues that 
the anti-foundationalism that deve-
lops in the post-Kantian period of 
German philosophy is precisely what 
distinguishes figures like Feuerbach, 
Niethammer, and the early Roman-
tics, from the group of German Idea-
lists, such as Fichte and Schilling. 
Frank draws a sharp line between 
early German Romanticism and Ger-
man Idealism (see especially my 
translation of his lectures, The Philo-
sophical Foundations of Early Ger-
man Romanticism, forthcoming with 
SUNY Press). Frank traces idealism 
to its articulation by Hegel that con-
sciousness is a self-sufficient pheno-
menon, one which is able to make 
the presuppositions of its existence 
comprehensible by its own means. 
Frank contrasts this kind of idealism 
and the accompanying view of the 
self-sufficiency of consciousness to 
the conviction that characterizes the 
early German Romantics, namely, 
that self-being owes its existence to a 
transcendent foundation which can-
not be dissolved by consciousness. 
Frank links this view of the primacy 
of Being to the romantic position that 
the true foundation of self-being is a 
puzzle that cannot be handled by re-
flection alone: to solve the puzzle we 
need to turn to art. 
Beiser makes reference to the ten-
sions between his idealist reading of 
the Romantics and Frank and Hen-
rich's anti-idealist reading, telling us 
that Frank and Henrich's sharp di-
stinction between German Idealism 
and early German Romanticism is 
the result of a „much too narrow44 (p. 
354) interpretation derived from fo-
cusing too much attention of a few 
early manuscripts. A serious limitati-
on of such a focus, Beiser claims, is 
that „it completely underrates the 
Platonic heritage of Hölderlin, Nova-
lis, and Schlegel44 (p. 355). Given 
Beiser's claim that: „the idealist di-
mension of absolute idealism comes 
from its rationalism" (p. 353), a ra-
tionalism unpacked in Platonic 
terms, we begin to see one aspect of 
the Platonic heritage that we would 
do well to take into account. Beiser 
also points to the Platonic renais-
sance that held sway in the late 
1790s and early 1800s in German 
speaking lands, a renaissance that 
did indeed influence the early Ro-
mantics. Not surprisingly, when Bei-
ser discusses the early German Ro-
mantics in Part III of his study, one 
of his central themes is the Platonic 
legacy that guided these thinkers (p. 
355 ff.). 
Beiser's account of romantic phi-
losophy as a breed of absolute idea-
lism does pay serious attention to its 
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roots in Spinoza and to the strong 
strands of naturalism present within 
it. As Beiser also claims that „abso-
lute idealism involves a greater de-
gree of realism than critical idealism 
[does]14 (p. 355), one begins to see a 
strongly realist reading of the Ro-
mantics' idealism. On Beiser's stron-
gly realist reading of idealism, when 
does idealism cease to be idealism 
and become a strange hybrid of rea-
lism and idealism that is uniquely ro-
mantic? Which is to ask, can we so 
easily reject Frank's view that early 
German Romanticism is not really a 
form of German Idealism at all? 
Beiser loads the absolute idealism 
which he claims characterizes the 
young Romantics with a heavy dose 
of Spinozism, Platonism, and vital 
materialism. The connection to vital 
materialism, whose supporters held 
that the essence of matter was force 
rather than extension, proves critical 
in coming to a full understanding of 
the romantic conception of nature, a 
crucial aspect of their philosophical 
project. 
Beiser's story nicely accommoda-
tes central themes attended to by the 
early German Romantics, especially, 
the role of aesthetic experience in 
their general framework for under-
standing reality and the coherence 
theory of truth that they endorsed. 
Beiser indicates that for the early 
German Romantics, the metaphysi-
cal claims of absolute idealism are 
such that to regard nature as an orga-
nism and as a work of art are one and 
the same: „The universe is nothing 
less than a natural work of art, a 
work of art is nothing less than an ar-
tificial organism. Hence, the realms 
of truth and beauty, the natural and 
the aesthetic, coincide" (p. 374). In 
connection with this point concer-
ning the intimate relation between 
truth, beauty, and the world, Beiser 
refers us to Friedrich Schlegel's des-
cription of the general standpoint of 
idealism: „Idealism considers nature 
as a work of art, as a poem" (p. 374). 
Beiser's reading of the early German 
Romantics as absolute idealists, whi-
le at odds with Frank's views does 
not, for the most part, mislead him in 
his interpretation of the major 
strands of early German romantic 
thought. Yet there is a strand of his 
argument which does seem to entail 
a somewhat distorted view of the 
early Romantics. 
One reason why the early German 
Romantics have so long been neglec-
ted is that their work is read as part 
of the tradition of classical German 
Idealism, and in the company of such 
grand system builders as Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel, their work, 
which was not designed with any 
grand-theory goals in mind, is often 
dismissed as incomplete and unim-
portant. Frank's strong and compel-
ling case against the move to read the 
Romantics as idealists at all is part of 
an effort to free them from the dark, 
heavy shadows cast upon them by 
the grand system builders of classical 
German Idealism. Beiser, in sharp 
contrast, argues that we can under-
stand the historical significance of 
the early German Romantics only if 
we come to an understanding of their 
absolute idealism and hence read 
them as German Idealists. Beiser's 
solution to the problems of neglect 
that have beset a proper reception of 
the early German Romantics is to 
present them as part of the constella-
tion of classical German Idealism (it 
is important to keep in mind, howe-
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ver, that Beiser explicitly states that 
his work „does not pretend to be a 
contribution to what the Germans 
call „Konstellationsarbeit" (ix)). Rei-
ser's portrait of the early German 
Romantics clearly shows that they 
were not subjective idealists, and he 
convincingly highlights the strong 
doses of realism and naturalism pre-
sent in their thought. In his reassess-
ment of the role that the grand sy-
stem builders played in German 
Idealism, Beiser urges us to keep in 
mind that, „Hegel exaggerated his 
own originality and individuality" (p. 
10), and that many of his ideas can 
be traced back to his predecessors in 
Jena, whose work has far too long 
been ignored. This move clears spa-
ce for the contributions of the early 
German Romantics to come into 
view. 
Yet, for all of his careful excavat-
ing work, there is something unsett-
ling about Beiser's suggestion that 
the early German Romantics' use of 
the fragment was part of a disorgani-
zed way to present their ideas; the 
fragments lacked systematicity and 
completeness which would be provi-
ded by the likes of Schelling or He-
gel: „What was merely fragmentary, 
inchoate, and suggestive in Hölder-
lin, Novalis, and Schlegel became 
systematic, organized, and explicit in 
Schelling" (p. 467) and „[w]hat Höl-
derlin, Schlegel, [and] Novalis ... 
had left in fragrnents-what they re-
garded as a mystical insight tran-
scending conceptual articulation-
Schelling would now try to 
rationalize and systematize" (p. 553). 
Although the study seeks to clear 
space on the map of ideas for thin-
kers squeezed out by Hegel, Beiser 
claims that „in unsurpassed fashion 
[Hegel] summarized and integrated 
into one system all the themes his 
less scholastic and organized con-
temporaries had left in fragments or 
notebooks" (p. 10). With claims like 
this, Beiser underestimates the philo-
sophical significance of the fragment 
and the very theme of incomplete-
ness that the Romantics develop in 
their work. 
Though Beiser frees the historical 
sky of the dark shadow cast over 
German Idealism by Hegel and the-
rewith casts much needed light on 
the early German Romantics, his re-
ading seems, at points, nevertheless 
guided by the lens of the classical 
German idealist system builders, lea-
ding him to reduce some of the Ro-
mantics' achievements, including 
their rejection of closed systems for 
the presentation of their ideas, to me-
re imperfect forms that awaited com-
pletion by system builders like 
Schelling and Hegel. As Beiser cor-
rectly indicates, Novalis did „nurture 
systematic ambitions" (p. 410), yet 
he fails to give sufficient attention to 
the fact that Novalis' conception of a 
system was quite unlike that of 
Schelling or Hegel. Novalis' aspirati-
on to fuse realism and idealism, an 
aspiration discussed by Beiser (see 
pp. 433 ff.) presents us with difficult 
philosophical problems. The first 
question that needs to be addressed 
is: what did Novalis' fusion of rea-
lism and idealism amount to? Bei-
ser's answer is that it amounted to 
absolute idealism. I offer a tentative 
word of caution that perhaps we 
would be in a better position to ap-
preciate the early German Romantics 
on their own terms, if we would un-
pack the uniquely romantic fusion of 
the realism and idealism in a way 
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that did not reduce their contributi-
ons to pieces of unfinished work that 
found its culmination in Schelling 
and Hegel's systems, that is, if the 
net we cast to catch their thoughts 
were not crowded with system buil-
ders. The romantic aspiration to fuse 
idealism and realism was related to 
their rejection of understanding rea-
lity in terms of categories of being 
and their turn towards processes of 
becoming, and to the ontological and 
epistemological problems that ac-
company such a shift in focus. 
Beiser's reading of the early Ger-
man Romantics as absolute idealists 
battling against subjectivism does 
shed new light on the Romantics' 
connections to and critiques of Kant 
and Fichte's idealism. Beiser's im-
pressive study of German Idealism's 
struggle against subjectivism (1781-
1801) concludes with a detailed ac-
count of Schelling's pivotal role in 
the development of absolute idea-
lism, in particular his break with 
Fichte and his important contributi-
ons to Naturphilosophie. 
Beiser's study uncovers the Plato-
nic moorings of German Idealism, 
clearing space for a realist reading of 
idealism. Moreover, with Beiser's 
reading of the Romantics as absolute 
idealists, a new debate is opened 
concerning the early German Ro-
mantics' relation to classical German 
Idealism, just the sort of debate that 
keeps philosophical interest in past 
historical periods alive and well. 
Anyone interested in the period of 
German philosophy from 1781-1801 
will benefit tremendously from a ca-
reful study of Beiser's work. 
